Purim - 5771

Purim - 5771

Rabbi Hal Miller

(Bear in mind that "Purim Torah" is a tradition of silliness, wrapped in

a package intended to look serious. But then, sometimes valuable lessons

appear in the strangest of places and formats......)

It has come to the attention of the rabbinate that the halachos of stoplights

are being acknowledged more in the breach than in the observance, so it seems

fitting at this juncture to spend a few moments discussing this area of law.

What is a stoplight? Trying to learn the laws covering them makes little

sense if we cannot first answer this question. Since it seems that these

items change with both time and place, understanding general rules is very

difficult without a clear picture of our subject matter.

A stoplight can be defined as a signalling device to control the flow of

traffic. Usually used in reference to motorized traffic, both land and

sea, it refers to any of a number of such devices. Some use electric

lights of different colors (thus the name) to encode various meanings,

others use some other signalling capability, such as written words or flags.

Stoplights vary by national custom as well. In some places, the color

order, top-to-bottom, is red, amber, green. In other places, that is

reversed. Some even display the colors side-to-side, with color order

in either direction. It is even possible that a traveler will see signs

that have no color scheme at all, either shining a light through a cut-out

(reading "stop" or "go", in whatever language), or a flag system where

flag-up means to stop, and flag down means go. A good example of cultural

difference in this area is the "Tahitian 4-way stop", defined as "honk from

a mile away while driving 90mph and if no one honks back, don't brake!"

Historically, in ancient times an equivalent signalling device was used

on the tops of mountains to provide a chain of communication from the

Great Sanhedrin through to the provinces (for declaring the new month.)

Light, in the form of fire on a tower, was used to tell people to stop

counting days in the old month and begin counting in the new month. In

more recent times, but when electricity was not yet readily available at

every street corner, having a light-bulb device at each intersection was

still not feasible. Whether those days had enough traffic to warrant such

a device everywhere is an interesting question. There were, obviously,

very few cars on the roads during the time period prior to having

widely-available electricity. To prove that this is not a good response,

we note that, prior to 1900, the very first licensed automobile in the

state of New York, and the second such vehicle, the only two in the

entire state, collided at an intersection. Had the mitzvah of

stoplights been observed, perhaps this would have been avoided. The

incident does, though, go toward answering a question we have not yet

asked, is this mitzvah d'oraisa (from the Torah) or d'rabbanan (from the

Rabbis)? It would seem that, ho'il, since the mitzvah would have made a

difference only from the time of that collision (there not having been more

than one motor vehicle in a location at one point in time) and on through

today, perhaps we must conclude that it is d'rabbanan. Hold that thought.

Now that we have an idea of what the subject matter is, our next question

must be, 'what is the Mitzvah of Stoplights?' What is our source? If in

fact, as above noted, it appears to be d'rabbanan, from what is it derived?

In Parshas Kedoshim [Vayikra 19:19] we read: "You shall not mate your animal

with another species, you shall not plant your field with mixed seed; and a

garment that is a mixture of shaatnez shall not come upon you." This is

explained in many places, all of which come to describe the mitzvah

of kilayim, illegal mixtures.

In addition to kilayim, ta'aruvos are additional 'mixtures', with rules

about what, when, etc. The Shulchan Aruch [87:1] states:

It is written three times in the Torah, "Do not cook a kid in its

mother's milk." Once for the issur of cooking, once for the issur of

eating, and once for the issur of ha'na'ah.

The Gemora in Chullin [97a-98a] goes through a long list of scenarios

where some level of nullification may be allowed, but the rule is that

mixing things can be a dangerous sport.

Such mixtures are problematic. Either 'taste' is transmitted illegally

from one item to another, ritual impurity is transmitted, animals get

into fights, or some similar negative issue occurs. Thus, it is clear

that 'mixing' items is a violation of Torah law where either the Torah

specifies it, or there is a clear negative outcome.

The case of the first two cars in New York demonstrates that there is always

such a danger when dealing with motor vehicles. The 'mixing' of two cars

does not qualify under the rule of mish'loach manos on Purim, the exchange

of gifts (in this case automotive parts and drivers). There is thus a

toladah (a derivative commandment) from kilayim, to observe stoplights.

This is then d'oraisa. If you recall, above we thought it might be

d'rabbanan. In either case, the Mitzvah of Stoplights is a requirement to

avoid the sudden mixing of vehicles with each other, or with any other thing,

animal, vegetable or mineral.

With the mitzvah thus established, we now ask, who is obligated? From

Megillas Esther [4:13-14] we find that even royalty is liable:

Mordechai said to Esther: If you persist in keeping silent at a time

like this, relief and deliverance will come to the Jews from some other

place, while you and your father's house will perish!

Keeping silent at a time of potential conflict can, as in the case of one

who "withholds testimony" in a court case, lead to damages. Application

of a device that speaks out in warning is the opposite of withholding

testimony, and is required per Mordechai's ruling. As with the ban on

withholding testimony, this mitzvah fits the category for which the Rambam

and Sefer HaChinuch say, "applies to all people, at all times and in all

places." Certainly the application varies some, as we note here, but the

fact that it does apply is consistent.

There remains a machlokes as to whether our mitzvah applies to the local

government to place the stoplights, or to the individual drivers to

observe them. Since these two circles of thought seem to indicate that

the content of the mitzvah is not a matter of concurrence, we need to

keep in mind both chains of logic.

On to our next question: how is this mitzvah fulfilled and enforced?

On the theory that knowing how it is enforced will lead us to a better

understanding of how it needs to be fulfilled, we delve into the latter

question first.

Pirkei Avos [2:1] tells us that "All your deeds are recorded in a book."

With this scary thought in mind, we continue [3:2] "Pray for the welfare

of the government, because if people did not fear it, a person would

swallow his fellow alive." Although this is a disturbing observation of

our society, anyone who has been waiting at the stop line for a light to

turn green, then seen multiple cars jump out in front to turn left before

the oncoming traffic gets into the middle of the intersection, knows that

without a traffic cop right there, it is just plain dangerous on the roads.

Thus, enforcement falls to the governmental agencies. The obvious problem

with this approach is that when societies leave responsibility in the hands

of government, 'rules' develop, and it engenders a profession (lawyers) to

find new and innovative ways to discover, or even to create, loopholes

allowing culpable persons to avoid shouldering responsibility for their

actions. We find in Psalms [1:10] a warning against making this possibility

a reality: "Love work, despise positions of power; and do not become overly

familiar with the government." But, here we are.

Once a matter gets to the court system, the rules dictate careful use of

process. Not only are we commanded to "make a fence for the Torah" [Pirkei

Avos 1:1], but the court itself is directed to put a stop to these wiseacres

trying to subvert justice: "They do not observe even the king's laws;

therefore it is not befitting the king to tolerate them." [Megillas Esther

3:8] Thus we see that when Queen Esther was asked to testify who it was

behind the evil in the kingdom, she laid it out: "An adversary and an enemy!

This wicked Haman!" [7:6]. Note that this is a single accusatory witness,

and the court is not allowed to accept testimony from a single witness. See

Rabbi Shimshon Rafael Hirsch on Vayikra 5:1, where he details the lack of

liability devolving upon a single witness who withholds testimony, because

of the general rule disallowing a witness who has no corroboration. Here

we see that, as he was required to do, the king refused to accept the claim:

"the king rose in a rage from the wine feast and went into the palace garden"

[7:7]. when the king returned, he witnessed Haman attacking Esther on the

couch, and was now himself the corroborating witness, thus the conviction

was sealed.

Now, how does all this apply to our situation? If anything, it seems to

reinforce the machlokes regarding who is liable: did this episode prove the

culpability of the governmental officer, Haman, or merely that the court does

in fact have the power to shout "Off with his head" in a case where the

defendant has violated a rule? The answer comes, curiously enough, from

another part of the Megillah [6:9] discussing rewards: "And parade him on

horseback through the city square proclaiming before him: 'This is what is

done for the man whom the king especially wants to honor.'" It took a

government regulation here, a leading runner, to ensure that everyone out

there saw Mordechai, and stayed out of the way, thus averting a collision.

But, it took the people observing that interim regulation (as well as some

thundering horses on a narrow street) to ensure a collision was avoided.

The mitzvah really applies to those driving on the road.

How does one fulfill it? Certainly, yield the right of way to thundering

horses, unless you are a very much bigger entity. There is no 'right' in a

graveyard. Common sense applies. Unfortunately, when treating the mitzvah

of stoplights, common sense seems to be excluded from most applications.

Fulfilling a commandment such as this one is difficult. There are times

when coming to a halt is the right thing to do, and other times when it is

the wrong thing to do. There are many potential confusing factors, such as

reverse-lanes, prohibited use of cell telephones, yield signs instead of

stoplights, emergency vehicles, etc.

To resolve this anathema, our Megilla [1:13] informs us, "The king

conferred with the experts who knew the times, for such was the king's

procedure to turn to all who knew law and judgment." This, of course, was

probably not done in the municipalities, as the king was rarely able to

get on out there to all of them. So, in [2:3], "And let the king appoint

officers in all the provinces of his kingdom." This can be understood as,

for municipal jurisdictions, "to each his own". And we see this in the

Mishnah [Negaim 1:2] "The reddish variegation in the snow-like white is

like red wine mixed with snow, that of the lime-like white is like blood

mixed with milk. This is the view of R'Yishmael. R'Akiva says, in both

cases the reddish shade is like wine mixed with water." All of that is

merely the difficulty involved in reaching agreement on what 'red' is,

imagine how difficult things become when we add 'amber' and 'green' to

the mix!

Thus, the best way to fulfill this mitzvah involves selecting top-notch

local officials to define and monitor observance, then staying off the

roads! See the Megillah [8:16], "The Jews had [stop]light and gladness,

and joy and honor." Purim Sameach!