Shabbos Parashas Ki Seitzei - 5780

Shabbos Parashas Ki Seitzei - 5780

Rabbi Hal Miller

If a man will have two wives, one beloved and one hated, and they bear him

sons, the beloved one and the hated one, and the firstborn son will be to the

hated one, then it shall be that on the day that he causes his sons to inherit

whatever will be his, he is not able to give the right of the firstborn to the son

of the beloved one ahead of the son of the hated one, the firstborn. Rather,

he must recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one, to give him double

in all that is found with him, for he is his initial vigor, to him is the right of the

firstborn. [Devarim 21:15-17]

One might think that these verses are about the pain that this 'hated' wife is

enduring. But that is often true even where there is no co-wife, and where

children are not involved, so why would the Torah limit itself as here? For

example, Abarbanel says that the verse should say im yihiyeh, if it will be,

but instead says v'yihiyeh, and it will be. When there is a hated wife God

intervenes and the firstborn son will always be born to the hated wife. But this

is not what our verses are really trying to get across.

Kiddushin 68a says that the verses apply to the happiness of a wife whose

marriage is allowed under Torah law, and the unhappiness of a wife whose

marriage is prohibited. Some prohibited marriages are void on the face, but

some are effective, even if they require being divorced immediately. One has

to ask on this though, based on the story of Yaakov, Leah, and Rachel. Even

though the Torah had not yet been given and they were not bound by its laws,

we know from various sources that the Patriarchs kept Torah laws. But one of

those laws prohibits marrying a sister of one's wife. Thus Leah's marriage

would have been valid, and Rachel's not. Under this argument, Leah should

have been called beloved and Rachel called hated, not the other way around.

Perhaps we can explain the result in that Rachel and Yaakov were "engaged"

prior to his marriage to Leah, thus it was Leah's that would seem invalid.

Yet all this is really a sidetrack from our verses. The point here has to do with

inheritance, and discussing who should receive the double portion of a firstborn

son. As proof, Ibn Ezra points at the phrase "on the day", and explains that

all this has to do with one's deathbed will or similar distribution of inheritance.

"He is not able" Onkelos translates as "he does not have the right" or permission

to distribute any way other than what the Torah here requires. "He must

recognize" means that he may not ignore a firstborn just because he prefers

a different son. Some note that the wording implies also that any first son born

after the death of the father is not counted for a double portion.

This leaves us wondering again about application to the Patriarchs. Avraham's

firstborn was Yishmael. Yitzchak's firstborn was Eisav. Yaakov's firstborn was

Reuven. The double portions went to Yitzchak, Yaakov, and Yosef! We can say

that the Torah rules just didn't apply, but these men followed them anyway.

This seems to say "followed when they could", which may be more accurate.

One might think that it isn't fair for the firstborn son to get a double portion

of inheritance. Our verses go to great length to say that it is the way God

wants things, and it is not for us to try to 'override' Him.